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Abstract:
The vital questions in child custody disputes all concern that which is in the best
interest of the child. Historically, interpretations of the “best interest” standard
have been founded upon presumptions steeped in the notion of natural rights and
duties based largely upon a mix of scientific and subjective conclusions regarding
gender-based parenting roles and the need to sustain them. My research
demonstrates that, as courts attempt to avoid the decisions of the past and submit
to the societal will of the present, the modern application of the “best interest of
the child” standard has led unexpectedly to an abandonment of the principle’s
primary purpose, which is to provide for the child‘s best interest, and should,
therefore, be changed with the adoption of specific suggestions that consider both
the natural and social interests of the child and, ultimately, places the child’s
interest above those of parents and politics.
I. Introduction
During the decision making process of a child custody proceeding, judges are
faced with an enormous responsibility - not only to the child, but also to society as
a whole. As studies have confirmed, the period immediately after a divorce is a
trying time for parents. For children, that period can be devastating and the effects
long term, leading to depression and even crime. Those effects are mediated only
by the cooperation and involvement of both parents during, and especially after,
the separation process.1 The level of cooperation and involvement parents are
willing to submit to, however, is measurable in remarkably large part by not only
the personal issues brought to the table by both parties, but also by the ability of
the judge to maintain a clear focus while controlling the proceedings, even in the
face of heated debates, in such a way that he might plan and implement a fair and
reasonable solution.
This undoubtedly difficult task is made even less bearable by outside pressures and
the existence of few consistent or cohesive guidelines or jurisprudence from which
the court might draw wisdom. Often the strategy of Solomon is called upon, but to

no avail. Parents are passionate about their offspring and are bound to do
whatever they feel is necessary to acquire custody. If they do not fight for custody,
in some courts, they could very well lose it - a parent’s greatest fear. However, as
Professor John Elster notes, “the more forcefully a parent presses a custody claim,
the more he proves himself unfit for custody.”2 Thus, parents are left as unsure as
the judge as to how to proceed.
In the section two of this paper, I will examine the best interest standard as it has
been applied from the Roman era to modern times, focusing special attention on
the reasoning behind various interpretations of the rule. In sections three and four,
I will examine the application of the rule today, as well as the factors which tend to
influence the conclusions. And finally, I will conclude by presenting a number of
suggestions which the courts should consider; allowing judges not only the
freedom of discretion within a more concrete framework, but also the right of
discretion within a framework centered around commonsense.
II. The Evolution of the Best Interest Standard
A. Paternal Preference
From the earliest written European laws, western society has recognized a father’s
absolute right to the children born of his marriage. In Rome, this right was referred
to as the patria potestas or “paternal power”.3 Initially, it was believed that a father
had supreme authority over all things concerning his children, well into their
adulthood.4 The rule, however, was not without purpose. By limiting the young
adult child’s ability to make financial decisions, for example, the rule succeeded in
limiting the risk of his losing the family fortune (assuming the father’s decisions
were more responsible than the son’s would have been). Over time, this led to a
centralization and strengthening of the family’s resource.5 Such leadership, it was
presumed, was in the best interest of not only the child, but of the entire family.
In English common law also, it was believed that the father had an automatic right
to the custody of all of the minor children of his marriage.6 The rule was supported
by two theories which I will refer to as sole provider and natural tenderness.
The first, sole provider, is an economically based theory. It refers to the belief that
the father, by virtue of his responsibilities regarding the “care, maintenance,
education and religious training” of his children, was assumed to have a
“corresponding entitlement to the benefits of his children, i. e., their services and
association.”7 The theory, like the doctrine of patria potestas, was rooted in mother
and child’s financial dependency on the father. This is not surprising, considering
the fact that, upon marriage, women were relieved of all of their property rights -

including rights in that which they acquired by inheritance and personal earnings.
Even they themselves became, in effect, “the property of their husbands”.8
Therefore, since the father was not merely the primary provider, but the sole
provider of their offspring (having acquired his wife’s holdings as his own), it was
thought that his superior financial status placed him in the best position for
governing his children’s interests and relationships.
The second theory, natural tenderness, refers to the belief that the father, as the
“author of their being”, would express the greatest love for the children of his
marriage, more so than even their mother, and would therefore care for them “most
wisely”, and would “feel for them a tenderness which [would] secure their
happiness…”.9 From these beliefs, it was logically reasoned that the best interest
of the child was to remain in the custody and control of the one who would,
because of his superior love (in addition to his superior financial position), be the
most willing and the most able to provide for the child’s future - his father. Thus,
the husband was automatically the preferred parent in divorce proceedings.
It was only during and after the 1830s that married women began to be viewed as
more than mere femme coverts (women under the cover or legal protections of a
man), but as able individuals and capable parents in the eyes of societal and legal
opinion.
This change in English law was due in large part to the growing female writers and
activists of early 19th century Europe. In particular, Lady Caroline Norton who,
after her own divorce, was refused access to her children by her abusive former
husband, even after one of them had taken ill.10 In response, Lady Norton
researched and lobbied what was to become the Infant Custody Act of 1839 into
law. Until that time, divorced women under the English common law had virtually
no claims to their own children.11 Instead, the mother, as merely the wife of her
children’s father, was entitled “only to reverence and respect”, but no power over
her children’s lives.12 Even afterward, divorced women were only allowed to
petition for the custody of their youngest children (up to age seven) with the
possibility of visitation with the older ones 13 - a privilege easily denied by the
husband. Still, the Act represented one of the first official exercises of what was to
eventually become known as the tender years doctrine.
In the United States, the rule of paternal preference was followed by many courts
well into the 19th century. The courts here, however, were faced with a dilemma.
Women had begun to acquire and maintain property rights of their own by this
time, so judges were no longer able to justify paternal preference based upon a
need for the father’s control or management of the children’s long term financial
affairs. Also, as women were becoming less dependent on men, due to their

growing interest in and willingness to seek educational and employment
opportunities, judges became less able to justify paternal preference based upon
the father‘s superior economic position as sole provider. Thus, the courts, without
a basis upon which to support a father’s automatic entitlement to the children by
virtue of necessity, his control of the family fortune, or any other advantage he
might otherwise have had with respect to their rearing, chose instead to rely,
though reluctantly in some cases, on the mere superiority of the father as parent by
virtue of his status as a man14 - a view that reflected perfectly the patriarchal mood
of American society at that time - as the foundation upon which to grant custody to
him.
In the Illinois decision of Umlauf v. Umlauf, for example, a case in which both
parents were deemed “fit and proper persons,“15 equally capable of physically and
financially caring for the interests of the children of their marriage, the court
applied the paternal preference rule, removing the child from the custody of his
mother with whom he had spent his past six years, whilst, at the same time, fully
rejecting one of the rule’s historical primary raisons d'être - the father’s supposed
natural tenderness.
Initially, the court in Umlauf stated that, without question, “no other person can
feel for a boy as his mother does, or show to him the love and affection which he
receives from his mother”.16 This marked a complete reversal of earlier common
law understanding which insisted that the father had a natural tenderness toward
his children superior to that of the mother, and would form a cornerstone of later
rulings favoring maternal custody. Nevertheless, the court went on to maintain the
rule, stating that “the right of the father is superior to that of every other person,
and can only be made to yield when it is manifestly inconsistent with the health
and welfare of the child.”17
Likewise, in Bryan v. Bryan , the court acknowledged all manner of faults on the
part of the husband including habitual drinking, a history of verbal abuse in front
of the children (with language the court described as “rude, harsh, and
indecorous”), and even an instance of physical battery in which he slapped his wife
“in fun”. On his wife’s part, the court acknowledged “paroxysms of causeless
rage” and faulted her attempt to remove herself and her children from what she
considered an unhealthy environment. Yet, other than the ruling in the his favor,
the most surprising aspect of the opinion was the court’s ambivalence in awarding
custody to the father due to the children’s youth (the youngest was just two years
old and the oldest only four). The court’s admitted hesitation evidenced a changing
attitude in American society toward recognizing maternal importance. Ironically,
the court reconciled its conflict by concluding that its decision was justified
because the father would be aided by his mother in caring for the children and

because both children had “passed the age when the mother's care, though valuable
and desirable, is indispensable”.18
Thus, even in cases where the qualities of the father were less than admirable and
even while hinting at the disturbing quality of their own decisions, some courts
were still quite comfortable granting custody to the father under the paternal
preference rule without any historical or scientific justification whatsoever. The
paternal preference rule and its application by virtue of necessity devolved, as the
best interest of the child went ignored, into little more than patriarchal
conservatism.
B. Maternal Preference and the Tender Years Doctrine
After centuries of supporting the father’s presumption of right to the unitary care
and control of his offspring, a number of European nations and American states
began to shift their views, recognizing, as if for the first time, the sheer
insensitivity and “cruelty” of denying the nature of the mother-child relationship,
particularly where very young children were concerned.19
In France, this change began with the repeal of Art. 261 of the Code Civil which
had previously granted the husband “superior rights” to the children of the
marriage, at least provisionally, after the divorce. Two years later, a similar article
was amended in Louisiana; only, rather than doing away with any preference
altogether, the state amended the statute so that provisional custody would be
given to the mother, “unless the judge decided that there were strong reasons to
deprive her of it, either in whole or in part….” 20
One of the earliest cases to highlight this transition in American common law,
from paternal preference in nearly all cases to maternal preference during at least
the child’s tender years, was the 1830 Maryland decision of Helms v. Franciscus.
The H elms decision affirmed the father’s status as “the rightful and legal guardian
of all his infant children…,”21 but it also made several arguments in favor of
maternal preference with respect to the custody of small children. Those arguments
were based primarily upon the idea of the mother as being the “natural nurturer” of
her young child.
The natural nurturer theory was very similar to the theory of natural tenderness in
that both were grounded in what was presumably the obvious - that the “natural”
parent has some inherent ability to desire and insure the success and survival of
her/his offspring. The two theories, however, were also quite distinct. The latter
was associated with a father’s perceived natural tendency to govern and provide
for the fruit of his loins (regardless of its age). The former was associated with the

mother’s perceived natural tendency to comfort and protect the babe suckled at her
breast.
The problem with the natural tenderness doctrine was its lack of distinctiveness.
Though the father may have a natural tendency to govern his child or provide for
its material needs, an independent mother is just as capable of doing the same… at
least until the child is of an age at which it can be properly governed by its father.
In addition, the bringing up of an infant includes, if nature’s rule be not broken,
breastfeeding. It would not have been completely illogical for the court to assign
this duty under the authority of the mother, with little allowance otherwise. Thus,
financial independence in addition to the mother’s unique ability to provide
nutritional sustenance to the child, which the court assumed contributed to her
stronger attachment to the child and vice versa, led the court to believe that the
interest of a small child was best served by the custody of his mother.22
Moreover, there seemed to be an element of guilt on the part of court when
deciding to remove a small child from its mother. In Helms, the court noted that,
“…even a court of common law will not go so far as to hold nature in contempt,
and snatch helpless, puling infancy from the bosom of an affectionate mother, and
place it in the coarse hands of the father.“ 23 . The sense of shame, however, was
altogether new. For, the court was mistaken. Under English common law, courts
did indeed allow for the snatching of “helpless” infants from their mothers’ bosom
- literally, even in cases where the divorce was the result of cruelty on the part of
the husband.24
Another interesting aspect of Helms is that, not only did the court choose not to
entertain the idea of a father’s superiority of natural affection or natural tenderness
towards his child during its infancy, the court readily denied it, by distinguishing
the father as “coarse” and as, apparently, the least suited for raising a small child.
According to the court, “…the mother is the softest and safest nurse of infancy”.
“With her”, the court concluded, “it will be left in opposition to this general right
of the father.” 25
Unlike the later cases of Bryan and to a greater extent Umlaut, the court in Helms
went beyond simply acknowledging a natural nurturer aspect of motherhood and,
in deciding what was in the best interest of the child, the court placed what it
perceived to be the need of the babe for its mother by virtue of its infancy and her
perceived natural abilities to provide for its affection, nutrition, and protection
above the centuries of legal history which had guaranteed the father a nearabsolute entitlement to all his offspring by virtue of, if nothing else, his
corresponding obligation of support. By doing so, the court put aside all notions of
paternal preference and opened the door to the recognition of maternal rights as

well as the right of the child to maternal love and his need for maternal association.
As the doctrine developed, the general rule became that, “in a divorce proceeding
other things being equal, if a child be of tender years its custody should be given to
the mother.” 26
In another case, Commonwealth ex. Rel. Keller v. Keller, both parents were equally
suitable for custody. Yet, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court maintained the
presumption that “…the needs of a child of tender years are best served by the
mother who, in the common experience of mankind, is better fitted to have the
charge of it”. 27 Over the next 40 years, courts continually reinforced the tender
years doctrine by making statements such as the one made in the case of Hershey
v. Hershey that “…in the absence of some compelling reason to the contrary
preference is to be given the mother in awarding custody of a child of tender years
.“28 That which was considered “compelling”, however, often amounted to nothing
short of abuse of the child or moral unfitness - as the court in Jordan v. Jordan put
it, “open concubinage with a paramour for a substantial period of time.”29
In Jordan, the Louisiana first circuit appellate court reversed a lower court ruling
and awarded custody to a wife who had been involved in a long term affair, had
spent time hospitalized for psychiatric care, and had been joblessness until two
months prior to the proceedings. She was awarded custody, despite the fact that the
children had been living with their father for over two years prior to the
proceeding.30 Thus, even bouts of insanity or the threat of disrupting the stability
of the child’s established home life were not necessarily enough to deny a mother
custody.
So it was, when applied, that the tender years rule resulted in mothers receiving
custody in cases they otherwise wouldn’t have and, at least in a few cases,
probably shouldn’t have. That is not to say, however, that maternal preferences
were considered with near as much absoluteness as paternal preferences had been
in the past. Tender years only applied to young children, as teenagers were
generally given the right to choose their own guardian. And, as seen in Bryan and
Umlaut, fathers were still granted custody when the children were not considered
by the court to be of tender years.
Either way, a combination of the practice of awarding custody in accordance with
perceived unique maternal attributes, even those limited in effect to the smallest of
children, and of the more outrageous court decisions in which women were
winning when they shouldn’t have, led to a political barrage of assault on maternal
preference across the nation, particularly during the 1970s and early 1980s when
campaigns in opposition to maternal preference began to grow and expand. As a
result, the courts and the legislatures were left with little choice but to jump on the

bandwagon as well.
In the New York case of State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, for example, the court
claimed that the tender rules doctrine constituted “judicial error” and called it a “a
blanket judicial finding of fact.” The general consensus was that what had started
out as a long awaited legal affirmation of maternal rights had turned into a femalecentered version of patria potestas, heavily biased against the father. The major
legal argument against the preference was that it deprived the father of “his right to
equal protection under the law“.31 For this reason, according to the court, there was
a “trend in legislation, legal commentary, and judicial decisions” away from the
presumption. The court noted the adoption of anti-presumption statutes across the
nation and the decline of the official application of the rule in American courts,
and made clear that that goal of the legislators and judges was to make it such that
“no party [would] be presumed to be able to serve the best interests of the child
better than any other party because of sex.”
In keeping with the trend, by 1981, at least twenty states had declared that any
consideration of maternal preference was unconstitutional, while the practice in
several others had become steadily limited.32 The demise of the tender years
doctrine was championed in part by men upset with being (at least in their eyes)
summarily denied custody, as well as those longing for the patriarchal days of old,
and in part by feminists desiring an opportunity to free themselves from the burden
of any presumption of primary responsibility in raising their own children.
A major non-constitutional argument made by opponents in the legal community
was based largely on the growing independence and improved economic status of
women during that time. Professor Title summed the position up quite well when
he stated that, “when a woman ‘s place was in the home, the maternal preference
rule may have had some marginal value as a consideration in awarding custody,
today it is an invalid consideration.” 33 Ironically, it was the utter lack of
independence of women in the past which kept them and their children apart. It
was their acquired independence which enabled the courts to grant them custody of
at least their youngest children. And, now, it was that same independence which
could cost them custody under a non-preferential system.
Nevertheless, the opposing lines of thinking led legislatures and courts to adopt
“gender neutral” rules and guidelines in order to pigeonhole judicial discretion.
However, the rules were loosely organized, based on past traditions and theories.
And, their utter lack of sufficient guidance has allowed judges ample discretion to
carry on as they had in the past, adapting whichever preference they hold to the
factors laid out before them. Courts are now as free as ever to award custody
however they see fit, and do. Not explicitly, but implicitly under the guise of the

“best interest” standard. Only, now, the opinions are at times without reason or
rationale, but are the result of personal prejudice or outside political pressures.
III. Problems with the Best Interest Standard
In custody disputes, the job of the courts has been to decide that which is in the
best interest of the child. In making its decision, the courts have always taken
several core factors into consideration. Initially, those factors included the
perceived natural attributes of the parents. As discussed earlier, this led to fathers
receiving custody in cases in which they had the economic upper hand. It later led
to mothers receiving custody in cases in which the court believed they had a
biological upper hand and in cases in which the children were too young for courts
to overcome the guilt of snatching them away.
As the 1980s approached, an attempt was made to do away with both the paternal
and maternal preference doctrines of the past via the design and adoption by courts
and legislatures across the country of modern gender-neutral rules and guidelines.
At present, the general rule is that the court is not allowed to presume a preference
for either parent, despite any superior natural or biological traits.
One benefit of the best interest standard is its flexibility, as it allows the court to
easily adapt its decisions to individual circumstances. Its major fault, however, is
that the opportunity for implicit presumptions is still there, even if the notions of
paternal preference based upon an explicit presumption of natural superiority are
not.
Because the evolution of the best interest standard has been nothing more than a
merging of both maternal and paternal preferences, its design is highly subjective
and highly vulnerable to manipulation. This is especially true when there is no
requirement that all of the factors be equally or reasonably considered. Bias judges
are allowed to support preferential rulings whenever they so desire by ignoring
those factors which conflict with personal points of view and making much ado
over those that do not. The best interest standard as it exists today is weak and
transparent; it may as well not even exist.
A. Lack of Guidance
Louisiana, Art. 134 of the Civil Code is very similar to those in other states in that
it advises the court to consider “all relevant factors” including those provided in a
list to be weighed by the court in its own discretion. Included among those in
Louisiana are considerations previously incorporated under historical preferences,
factors such as the “emotional ties” between parent and child, and the “capacity

and disposition” of each for love, affection, spiritual guidance, education, etc..,34
both of which relate to the historical notions of natural nurturer and natural
tenderness. The court, however, is not provided with any information as to the
weight that should be given to each factor. Instead, the judge is left to infer from
past attempts on the part of the parents or glean what they can from present
evaluation to determine that the parents have established a bond with the child and
then decide which is the strongest. Also, the court is placed in the position of
predicting whether the parents are capable and likely to make such attempts in the
future if given custody. This is not only subjective, but vulnerable to exacerbation
by both parties. A judge preferential to either parent could use both rules to his
advantage.
Another factor the court is given the option of considering is the “capacity and
disposition” of the parent to provide the child with various material needs such as
food, clothing, and medical care. This factor is closely related to the economic
aspect of the paternal preference rule which justified awarding custody to the
father because of his role as sole provider. Because the father provided for all of
the child’s “care, maintenance, education and religious training”, he was assumed
to have a “corresponding entitlement to the benefits of his children, i. e., their
services and association“ as a result.35 Though they may no longer be the sole
providers, fathers are still the primary providers for their children’s material needs
due to their higher incomes.36 Thus, men are at a clear advantage when this fatherfriendly factor is considered. Without further guidance as to how this factor is to
be measured, the mothers may not stand a chance in the courts of a judges biased
in favor fathers who and who are allowed to consider or give substantially more
weight to this factor than other more mother-friendly factors.
Similarly, the consideration of responsibilities for the “care and rearing of the child
previously exercised” is closely related to the tender years doctrine of the maternal
preference rule. Since women are usually the ones responsible for feeding, bathing,
and grooming young children, arranging play-dates, baby-sitters, etc., they are at a
greater advantage where this factor is concerned. Thus, a father who has not been
emotionally and intimately involved in the personal goings on of his child is
unlikely to fair well in a court of a judge biased in favor of mothers who is allowed
to give a excessive amount of consideration to this particular factor.
Not only does the Louisiana article, and those like it, not offer guidance as to how
much weight should be given to each factor provided, rarely do the comments to
those articles; this leaves open doors to presumption and preference. What’s
worse, in Louisiana, the court is given the discretion to act however it sees fit, with
the ability to consider or reject any or all of the factors, unlike the “source
provision, which required the court to reach its decision only ‘after consideration

of evidence introduced with respect to all‘”.37 Thus, there is not the balancing of
the various factors that one might expect and no possibility of mutual cancellation
of mother-friendly and father-friendly factors. Rather, judges are allowed to pick
and choose which factors they consider most valuable. This naturally leads to
inconsistency in results and a perpetuation of unfairness against both fathers and
mothers. The result is a system in which the courts are allowed to move away from
what is truly in the best interest of the child by using legal factors to swing their
opinions in the direction of whichever preference they most favor.
B. Personal Preference
Initially, it was believed that removing the maternal and paternal preference
options from judicial discretion would lessen if not end completely the perceived
unfairness in the system and bias against both parents, particularly fathers. The
result, however, was just the opposite. Judges have as much discretion as ever and
the effects of the modern best interest standard have led to unpredictability in child
custody cases across the nation. One of the primary reasons behind the
inconsistency of decisions is that judges are still applying their own preferences,
with noticeable differences in analysis and application of the rule by older and
younger judges.
This phenomenon was evidenced in Professor Stamp’s study on the “Age
Differences Among Judges Regarding Maternal Preference in Child Custody
Decisions” which surveyed judges from four states (Alabama, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Tennessee) on the issue.38 The study asked questions designed to
“measure their beliefs with regard to maternal preference”. Those surveyed
included young judges between the ages of 40 and 49 and older judges between the
ages of 60 and 69. The statements to which the judges were asked to respond
closely resembled the inherently preferential theories traditionally held by judges
in child custody disputes. The judges’ responses reflected their inclinations with
respect to specific historic theories of child custody.
One item, which dealt directly with the tender years doctrine, stated that: “mothers
are the preferred custodian when children are under the age of 6.” In response,
36% of the youngest judges and 71% of the oldest judges agreed with the
statement. In contrast, 0% of youngest judges and only 1% of the oldest ones
agreed with the statement that “fathers are the preferred custodian when children
are under the age of 6.” This seemed to suggest a significant maternal preference
on the part of older judges.
Another item, which dealt with the natural nurturer theory, stated that “mothers,
by nature, make better parents than fathers”. The study showed that only 5% of the

youngest judges and 46% of oldest judges agreed with the statement. Again, the
older judges seem to reveal a maternal preference. Interestingly, however, though
most of the youngest judges were unwilling to answer in agreement to the
suggestion that mothers are, by nature, better parents, none of them were willing to
agree to the statement that: “fathers, by nature, make better parents than mothers”.
In fact, 68% of the youngest judges and 84% of the oldest disagreed with the
natural tenderness related statement.
Professor Stamps suggests that the findings of the survey are consistent with
reviews of appellate cases and opinions of mental and legal experts which
“indicate that maternal reference still plays a definite role in many custody
determinations”, and reveal a strong bias in favor of maternal preference among
older judges. The author also offers an explanation for the generation gap in legal
opinion. According to him, the oldest judges were the product of a time when
“divorce was rare and family roles were fixed”. Young judges, on the other hand,
grew up in the age in which divorce was more common and gender roles were
blurring. This explanation, however, does not hold.
In 1940, the divorce rate per 1,000 was 2.0. However, it got as high as 4.3 in 1946
and did not reach that level again until 1973.39 “Of the couples who married in
1950, it was 25 years before even 25 percent were divorced.”40 In other words,
both the older judges and the younger judges were born and raised in environments
in which divorce, though certainly not as common as it is today, was also not
experienced to significantly greater degrees between them. Even if it were true,
however, it would not be wise to assume that the judges who grew up during the
1950s and 1960s were not influenced by their parents’ upbringing during the 1930s
and 1940s – the period of the traditional home’s proverbial peace. It is even less
wise to assume that the roles of women in the family during those eras changed to
any significant degree. In the 1950s, for example, the average wife worked until
her child was born, but didn’t return until her child had entered school.41
Therefore, though it is true that women were not staying home as much as before,
the desires, expectations, and responsibilities with respect to rearing their children
remained the same.
What is more likely an explanation for the differences between the opinions of
older and younger judges is the fact that the young judges were influenced heavily
during their early adulthood (in the mid to late 1970s and early 1980s) by the
changing climate of that time. It is no coincidence that this period in their lives
coincided with the rise of feminist mantra, father’s rights rhetoric, and the repeal
of maternal preference rules across the country. Either way, attempts by judges young or old - to adjust or interpret the factors in such a way that they align either
with personal preference or outside opinion do nothing more than inhibit justice.

One example of this is Michigan case of Ireland v. Edwards.
In Ireland, a young mother filed an action for child support against her child’s
father only to have him petition for custody and win. The decision was
unbelievable, considering the fact that, until the initial action, the child had never
lived with anyone other than its mother and the father hadn’t bothered to seek
visitation until a year after the child’s birth. Even more unimaginable was the fact
that she lost custody simply because her provision for the child’s care while she
attended classes - a day-care center, was rejected by the trial judge due to his
preference for the father’s proposed provision - a “blood relative” (his mother).42
Interestingly, the trial judge in the case found both parties perfectly equal or
neutral in regards to every factor of the Michigan child custody statute, except the
one he misinterpreted in favor of the father - “the permanence, as a family unit, of
the existing or proposed custodial home or homes". According to the appellate
court, which reversed the ruling, the statute had to do with the permanence of the
“family unit” (i.e. the likelihood that the family would stay intact). It was
completely unrelated to “an evaluation about whether one custodial home would
be more acceptable than the other”.43
Furthermore, the father lived at his parents’ home without a clue as to “his own
future education, housing, or employment”. It was illogical to award custody to a
man so completely unfocused as to his own future, someone who had taken no
interest in the child for her first year, and someone who had never taken any long
term care of the child, over the mother with whom she had spent her entire life,
just because his mother would be available to baby-sit. The result of the trial
court’s decision was not based upon a fair evaluation of the factors or the child‘s
best interest, but upon the speculation and personal preference of the trial judge.
Such is exactly the sort of decision making our system of justice should seek to
avoid.
C. Societal and Political Pressures
Studies on judicial thought and the results of judicial applications of the best
interest rule supposedly reveal the tendency of American judges to interject their
own personal prejudices into their decision making process. However, such studies
often do not discuss the pressures judges receive from the outside which influence
not only judicial opinion, but society as a whole.
With respect to child custody, there are two main sources of outside influence with
which judges must contend. The first of the two is the feminist regime. The second
is the father’s rights regime. The primary argument of both is that there is no

scientific support for any parental preferences - particularly maternal. Both groups
have essentially bullied the courts into discounting or completely ignoring
biological evidence in favor of a presumption of sexual equality. They argue that
the sex of either party should never be taken into account when determining a
child’s best interest. This presumption, however, though legally permissive, is
scientifically flawed.
Sexual equality does not exist. Biology has shown and evolutionary psychologists
agree, men and women are distinct. Women, for example, have a great deal more
invested in the survival of their offspring than men.44 They are less aggressive,45
more emotionally adept, and have better senses of touch, hearing, and sight.46 To
suggest that these traits should not be considered by a court in awarding custody of
a young child is to reject human reality in favor of legal fantasy. Either way, any
court’s reliance on natural attributes should not be considered “arbitrary”. For,
such traits evolved, at least in part, for the very purpose of enabling women to do
that which has been the circumstance, responsibility, desire, and expectation of
them in nearly all cultures and species throughout time - to care for their young.
This reminder, however, frightens both feminists and father’s rights advocates.
Professor Chambers framed their argument well in his article “Rethinking the
Substantive Rules for Child Custody Disputes in Divorce“:
Even if a preference for women would produce slightly better
dispositions for children across the generality of cases today
and even if it turned out that some parenting propensities were
genetically transmitted and hence unalterable, gender-based
rules might transmit a harmful message to both men and
women about appropriate spheres of responsibility. The harm
from such a message might well be thought to outweigh the
value to children to be obtained from the general rule.47
I disagree, however, with the suggestion that what is best for the child should be
outweighed by that which is best for parental and societal ego. Children suffer the
most as a result of divorce proceedings. If for no other reason than that, parents
who choose to divorce should be willing to put aside all notions of personal
privilege or political correctness in favor of placing the child‘s needs paramount to
their own. That would include, if it is truly to the child’s advantage, a
consideration of natural paternal or, in this case maternal, attributes. As one
commentator put it, if the mother is “biologically or culturally or through a
combination of the two better qualified for the care of children“, then “the law
should create a rebuttable presumption in favor of the mother.” 48 Ultimately, it is
the duty of the court in a child custody case to do only that which is in the child’s

best interest, not to sooth the political and societal wounds of self-centered,
emotionally-charged neo-activists.
IV. Suggestions
1. Swift adjudication. To allow a child custody case to extend for an unspecified
period of time inevitably “aggravates the friction between the parents and adds to
the tensions the child is already experiencing“. Measures should be in place to
ensure that the question of permanent custody is not drawn out, but is instead
handed down promptly “so that they may salvage what they can of their lives and
plan the future with some degree of certainty,” regardless of the judge’s
determination.49 Thus, the best interest of the child’s emotional welfare, as well as
physical, becomes of considerable importance in the process and the decision.
2. Environmental and emotional stability. Courts are often asked to infer from past
acts on the part of the parents, or glean what they can from present circumstances
to determine whether a parent is able to provide for his/her child. However, courts
should not be placed in the position of predicting or speculating as to whether one
parent or another is capable of or likely to do what they have never done before.
Though the parent unused to caring for the child might actually be physically able
to fumble into it relatively decently, the long term effects may not be worth the
trouble. Since, after divorce, “the quality of child rearing competence” received by
the child is of the utmost importance,50 significant consideration should be given to
the parent who has had the most experience in actually rearing the child, not the
one who might just be able to pull it off . Significant weight should also be given,
if applicable, to factors relating to the “stable, adequate environment” in which the
child currently lives.
One of the primary problems with joint custody arrangements is that they can
never truly exist. It is practically impossible to split either the child or his time
equally between both parents. Attempts via constant migrations back and forth are
disruptive and, especially in the case of very small children, potentially
damaging.51 Therefore, the courts should consider it in the child’s best interest to
decide upon a primary custodial parent with generous visitation rights (if
warranted) to the other. Since stability is a priority in a child’s early years after
divorce, the court should make every effort to limit disruption to his environment
and the life he is used to leading.
3. Maintenance of the care-giver relationship. In response Professor Stamps’
survey statement that: “a mother who has performed most of the child’s nurturing
and maintenance activities would be favored in custody decisions”, 97% of the
youngest judges and 96% of the oldest judges agreed. Similarly, 95% of the

youngest judges and 81% of the oldest judges agreed with the statement that: “a
father who has performed most of the child’s nurturing and maintenance activities
would be favored in child custody decisions”.52
These statistics suggest a positive point of view on the part of many judges, young
and old, that it is not maternal or paternal preference that should be the deciding
factor in child custody decisions, but the question of which parent has been the
most directly involved, the most hands on, the “primary caregiver” of the child
throughout its life. Still, the primary caregiver theory is viewed by some as nothing
more than a smoke screen for maternal preference. That argument is valid, since
women have been in the past and remain the primary caregivers of their children.
In fact, during the late 1980s and well into the 1990s, after the anti-maternal
preference revolution, many women put their priorities with respect to work and
family in the traditional order. They reverted back, as near as possible, to the ways
of the past and chose to reclaim their historical and monumental roles in their
children’s lives.53 A “substantial body of research shows that a significant amount
of division of labor within the family still exists. Fathers work long hours outside
the home, earn more, and do substantially less housework and child care.”54
Nevertheless, the issue is not and never should have been whether or not mothers
are advantaged by the primary caregiver concept by virtue of their decision to act
more personally in their children’s lives. Mothers should not be punished or
disadvantaged for raising their children, but that is effectively what would happen
with the elimination or minimization of such activity as a judicial consideration.
Rather, the issue should be whether or not it is in the best interest of the child to be
raised by the parent, mother or father, who has been the most involved in his
upbringing. Sources noted above with respect to stability as well as noted
psychoanalyst J. Bowlby suggest that it is.
Bowlby expressed the belief that “the child who is separated from a primary
caretaker early in life is more likely than other children to develop into an adult
less capable than others of forming and maintaining emotional ties and to be
subject to sudden depressions and to periods of acute anxiety.”55 Thus, since the
primary caregiver relationship can create stronger or necessary “emotional ties” via
attachment between the parent providing personal services (as oppose to the parent
providing more material ones) and the child which can aid in the child‘s
psychological development, then it is in the child’s best interest for that factor to
be given significant weight in consideration.
4. Consideration of every and all matters which may effect the child’s interests,
including whatever historical, social, and biological associations exist with respect
to his parents. The suggestion that no parent should be deemed better or less fit for

custody by virtue of his sex alone makes sense, but to suggest that biological traits
should be ignored completely is ridiculous for two reasons.
First of all, the courts in Louisiana are allowed to consider the “mental and
physical health” of the parties in deciding custody. Generally, this factor is
consider only in so far as the parent’s condition may harm the child‘s interest. But,
since there is no measure in the guideline related to the extent to which this factor
may be used, it would be fair to argue that, since individuals with certain mental or
physical inadequacies are kept from receiving custody, then it should also the case
that individuals with certain extra mental or physical abilities should be given
greater consideration in custody matters. This is particularly true when they may
suggest a better ability to connect with the child or a greater “capacity and
disposition” to express the emotional stimulation and support the child needs.
Secondly, it would not violate the due process rights of fathers to consider such
factors, despite arguments to the contrary. In Ex Parte Divine, the court accused
the tender years doctrine of being an “unconstitutional gender-based classification
which discriminates between fathers and mothers in child custody proceedings
solely on the basis of sex”. 56 Two Supreme Court cases are often cited in support
of this argument, Reed v. Reed and Frontiero v. Richardson. The factual
circumstances, however, are not entirely comparable.
In Reed and Frontiero, the court dealt with laws designed to discriminate for the
sake of administrative efficiency. According to the court in Reed, “mandatory
preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to
accomplish the elimination of hearings … is to make the very kind of arbitrary
legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment“. 57 The purpose of considering biological advantages of the sexes,
however, would not be for the purpose of efficiency with respect to the child
custody hearing. Rather, it would relate to the essential element of the hearing
itself - the effect, if any, it had on the child‘s interest.
In more recent cases, the Supreme Court has even allowed for gender
discrimination under certain circumstances. For example, in the case of Miller v.
Albright, the court upheld a law which established upon birth the U.S. citizenship
of illegitimate foreign-born children whose mothers were U.S. citizens but did not
do the same if their fathers were U.S. citizens. The court’s rationale related to a
fundamental difference between men and women – mother’s know immediately of
their child’s existence “due to the normal interval of nine months between
conception and birth”, while an unmarried father may never know the child exists.
Thus, the court concluded, the parents were not “similarly situated” because of this
biologically based distinction. Similarly, in the realm of child custody, laws

relating to the biological distinctions between mothers and fathers that suggest that
they are indeed differently situated such that either has a trait preferable for the
child’s upbringing should not be summarily dismissed or cast out as arbitrary.58
Again, three years later, the law was challenged because it provided different rules
for attaining citizenship by children born out of wedlock outside of the United
States, depending on whether the mother or father had American citizenship.
Again, it was upheld. In, Tuan Anh Nugyen v. INS, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy,
stated that the law "is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection." "For a gender-based classification to withstand equal protection
scrutiny it must be established 'at least that the classification serves important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives".59
In child custody law, science has shown that gender based distinctions between
men and women, if embraced, may prove to be in the child's best interest. If this is
the case, then classifications based upon those distinctions would serve an
important governmental objective by improving the lives of its children.
Furthermore, any statute allowing for the recognition of the biological attributes of
men and women would not command "dissimilar treatment for men and women
who are similarly situated," (as was the case in Frontiero).60 If science continues to
show that men and women are inherently distinct with respect to their child rearing
attributes, the government’s interest in having custody disputes resolved in the
manner most likely to have a positive effect on the child’s best interest would
justify biological consideration, despite its “discriminatory” nature.
V. Conclusion
Without question, it is the duty of every judge in a child custody decision to do, to
the fullest extent possible, what is in the best interest of the child. The court must
consider every child as an individual and take into consideration everything that
would aid in determining what is best for the child’s emotional and physical well
being. To do that requires the court to foster communication and cooperation
between the parents, but it also requires the court to put aside any fears of political
pressure and lay to rest any burden he may feel to correct centuries of perceived
wrongs. Only when the child is the focus of decision-making in child custody
cases will decisions made truly reflect the child’s best interests.
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